Case Summaries

[09/03] Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Anderson Senior Living Prop., LLC.
In an appeal from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's (BAP) grant of debtors' motion to dismiss as moot pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 363(m), plaintiffs' appeal of the bankruptcy court's authorization of the sale of debtors' interests in seven co-owned properties as well as the undivided interests of the tenants in common (TIC), is affirmed as the BAP properly determined that section 363(m) moots the appeal because, even though the bankruptcy court approved the sale of the TIC property interests pursuant to section 363(h), the debtors ultimately sold the properties pursuant to section 363(b) and that sale was never stayed.

[09/03] Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.
In property owners' class action suit against the facility operators of a former nuclear weapons plant under the Price-Anderson Act (PAA), alleging trespass claims arising from the release of plutonium particles onto their properties, district court's judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in awarding over $926 million is reversed and remanded where: 1) district court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331; 2) because the jury was not properly instructed on an essential element of plaintiffs' PAA claims, the verdict must be set aside and the case remanded; 3) the issue of whether federal nuclear safety standards preempt state tort standards of care under the PAA is remanded; 4) the Colorado Supreme Court would not permit recovery premised on a finding that an interference, in the form of anxiety or fear of health risks, is "substantial" and "unreasonable" unless that anxiety is supported by some scientific evidence, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise; 5) defendants failed to establish that any of the state of federal standards referenced in their proposed jury instructions overcome the general rule that the jury must determine whether a given interference is "unreasonable" by weighing the harm against the utility of the interference; 6) on remand, plaintiffs are required to prove the plutonium contamination caused "physical damage to the property" in order to prevail on their trespass claims; and 7) district court did not err in instructing the jury that it could award punitive damages in the case.

[09/02] Bakalar v. Vavra
In an action seeking a declaration that plaintiff was the owner of a drawing by Egon Schiele, judgment for plaintiff is vacated where: 1) although it is unclear whether a cause of action comparable to the counterclaims of defendants could be successfully brought in Austria, allowing the claims to go forward under New York law was consistent with the principles underlying the decision of the Supreme Court of Austria; and 2) the district judge, by applying Swiss Law, erred in placing the burden of proof on defendants to show that the Nazis looted the drawing.

[09/02] Vanderkous v. Conley
In a trustee's suit seeking to quiet title to certain real property, trial court's finding that the trustee's attempt to dismiss the action was void ab initio, because it was made after trial court had commenced and after it had entered judgment quieting title in trustee and directing him to pay defendant the full market value of the property as compensation for defendant's equitable interest, is affirmed where: 1) the trial court properly set aside trustee's purported dismissal of the action; 2) the court properly ordered the trustee to compensate defendant for her equitable interest in the property when it quieted his title to the garage area; and 3) substantial evidence supports the property's valuation as a conforming legal lot.

[09/01] Gallagher v. Magner
In consolidated actions by several owners and former owners of rental properties in St. Paul, Minnesota, challenging the City of St. Paul's enforcement of its housing code, summary judgment for defendants is affirmed in part where: 1) plaintiffs did not assert a claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework; 2) plaintiffs were not exercising a right under the Fair Housing Act by leasing to racial minorities; and 3) plaintiffs failed to reference a particular section of the St. Paul Code, let alone analyze why that section was vague. However, the order is reversed in part where the city's aggressive enforcement of the Housing Code resulted in a disproportionate adverse effect on racial minorities, particularly African-Americans.

[08/31] Wickens v. Shell Oil Co.
In plaintiffs' suit against Shell Oil under Indiana's Underground Storage Tank Act, claiming that Shell Oil was liable for the contamination on a plot of land where plaintiffs' shoe store was located, district court's grant of most of the plaintiffs' requests for corrective actions costs and attorney's fees is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded where: 1) without a better showing from the plaintiffs' attorney, the court will assume that the district court did its job properly when it decided to award $37,443.25 in litigation costs and disbursements; 2) there is no error in ordering Shell to pay for the corrective action costs incurred in May and June 2007; 3) district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the attorney's request for prejudgment interest; 4) district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Shell's Rule 60(b) motion; and 5) district court's judgment is reversed and remanded insofar as it miscalculated when it deducted the attorney's wife's fees from the attorneys' fees award.

[08/31] Colony Cove Properties, LLC. v. City of Carson
In a mobilehome park owner's challenge to a city ordinance specifying conditions permitting conversion of a mobilehome park from landlord ownership to resident ownership, trial court's conclusion that the city's responsibilities when faced with a mobilehome park conversion application were essentially ministerial, in issuing a writ directing the city to vacate the ordinance in its entirety and to vacate an ordinance imposing a moratorium on mobilehome park conversions while the city studied the issue is affirmed in part and reversed in part where: 1) trial court's conclusion that the city's role under section 66427.5 is purely ministerial is incorrect; 2) the ordinance at issue conflicted with section 66427.5 and is therefore invalid; and 3) the issue of the validity of the moratorium was moot at the time the writ was granted.

[08/31] Roberts v. Doyle
An order of the Second Circuit enjoining the Secretary of State from placing Amendment 3 on the November 2010 general election ballot is affirmed where: 1) the ballot title and summary are confusing to the average voter as the lack of an effective date renders it impossible for a voter to know which homeowners would qualify for the exemption; 2) the ballot title and summary fail to mention that a married person could fail to qualify for the exemption because his or her spouse previously owned a residence; and 3) a voter reading the title and summary could easily conclude that in order to be eligible for the additional homestead, a property owner would have to meet two conditions.

[08/31] Pac. Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates LLC. v. City of Los Angeles
In a developer's suit against the City of Los Angeles for rejecting as incomplete an application for conversion of its mobilehome park because the application failed to include an application for clearance under the Mello Act and an application for a coastal development permit under the Coastal Act, trial court's entry of judgment directing issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding the city to deem plaintiff's application complete is reversed and vacated as, in light of the paramount concern for protecting coastal resources by regulating development as expressed in the Coastal Act, section 66427.5 does not preclude the city from imposing conditions and requirements mandated by the Mello Act and Coastal Act on a subdivider seeking to convert to resident ownership a mobilehome park located in the coastal zone.

[08/30] Vill. Northridge Homeowners Ass'n v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
In homeowners association's suit against an insurance company, claiming that the insurer fraudulently induced it to settle a Northridge earthquake-related claim for less than it was worth under the policy, judgment of the court of appeals is reversed as a release of a disputed claim does not permit a party to elect the remedy of a suit for damages when the release itself bars that option. Instead, the insured party to the release must follow the rules governing rescission of the release before suing the insurer for damages.

[08/30] Critzer v. Enos
In plaintiffs' suit against a homeowners association (HOA), and a property owner and its successor in interest, involving a dispute concerning a window installed in defendant-property owner's upstairs bathroom, trial court's order enforcing the parties' settlement is reversed where: 1) the order enforcing the settlement finally determined the rights of the parties, and therefore, the order is amended to include an appealable judgment; and 2) because there was neither an oral settlement all parties personally agreed upon, nor a written settlement signed by all of the parties, the court lacked authority under the summary procedure of section 664.6 to enforce any settlement.

[08/27] State of Texas v. Brownlow
In property owners' suit against the state for inverse condemnation for removing dirt from their property after obtaining an easement to construct a mitigation pond on the property to collect water that would result from a highway expansion project, the court of appeals' reversal of trial court's dismissal of the suit is affirmed as the easement did not grant the state the right to use the excavated dirt for highway construction, plaintiffs' suit states a takings claim under the Texas Constitution, and the state does not have sovereign immunity from the suit.

[08/27] SKS & Assoc., Inc. v. Dart
In plaintiff-residential rental property owner's 42 U.S.C. section 1983 suit against a judge and a sheriff, claiming that the judge's general order directing the sheriff not to carry out residential evictions during particular winter weeks violated its federal constitutional rights, district court's dismissal of the suit is affirmed where: 1) based on the same principles of equity, comity, and federalism that are the foundation of Younger abstention, abstention is required in this case; and 2) to the extent that delays in state court processes adversely affect plaintiff, it can and must seek remedies through the state courts themselves.

[08/25] DPC Indus., Inc. v. Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co.
In an action seeking additional insurance coverage against a liability insurer, summary judgment for defendant is affirmed where: 1) nothing in the policy or an additional endorsement required that an insured property be actually owned or operated by the specific entity seeking coverage related to that facility; and 2) the record contained uncontradicted evidence that defendant provided indemnity coverage to plaintiff.

[08/24] Rexam Beverage Can Co. v. Bolger
In a commercial landlord-tenant dispute involving at a warehouse with a leaky roof, the replacement of which both landlord and tenant denied was their responsibility, judgment in favor of defendant-landlord on his counterclaim on several Illinois state law grounds is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded where: 1) a conclusion that tenant was contractually bound to replace the roof of the warehouse is affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded; 2) district court's award of $405,470 in damages for tenant's failure to replace the roof is affirmed; and 3) district court's Holdover Statute award of $1,156,232.24 is vacated and remanded for a determination of the fair market net rental value of the property and the assessment of a penalty equal to double that value for the duration of the tenant's holdover.

Back to Main